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It would be difficult to find any facet of Japan's cultural heritage that exercises as powerful a hold on the world's popular imagination as the samurai.1 For the most part, the image of the samurai and the tradition he represents is positive. Japanese warriors are the heroes of movies, TV shows, and novels, and the role models for hundreds of thousands of martial arts students around the globe. But for many among the generation that fought Japan in the Pacific War, for much of the political left in Japan, and especially for many of the peoples and governments of the lands that were occupied by Japan in the course of the war, the legacy of the samurai also has its sinister side. In examining this issue, I will first discuss the term and concept of bushidd itself, and then look at some of the wartime behavior of the Imperial Army, comparing it to the battlefield conduct of the samurai.
Bushidi in Medieval & Early Modern Japan
Hanging the label of "bushide' on either the ideology of the Imperial Army or the warrior ethic of medieval Japan involves some fairly overt historian's sleight-of-hand. In the first place, the term was not used to designate a code of warrior behavior until the early modem era and was only rarely used in this context prior to the late nineteenth century. (In fact the word was so unusual that Nitobe Inazo, whose 1899 tract, Bushidd: the Soul of Japan, probably did more than any other single book to popularize the idea of bushido in both Japan and the West, was able to believe that he had invented it himself!)5 The concept of a code of conduct for the samurai was a product of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Japan was at peace, not the medieval "Age of the Country at War." The samurai of this later period were bureaucrats and administrators, not fighting men; the motivation held in common by all those who wrote on the "way of the warrior" was a search for the proper role of a warrior class in a world without war. The ideas that developed out of this search owed very little to the behavioral norms of the warriors of earlier times.
Bushid6 or Bull? A Medieval Historian's Perspective 341
One of the basic tenets that modem writers associate with bushiddis that a true samurai was not only willing to risk his life when called upon to do so, but actually looked forward to the opportunity to sacrifice himself in the line of duty. As Swinson puts it, "the essence of bushido was that the young warrior should aim at dying.... In any event, death for the samurai was not something to be avoided; it was 'a consummation devoutly to be wished'; it was the realization of a great and wonderful ideal. Modem bushid6 is closely bound up with the notion of a Japanese "national essence," and with those of the kokutai, or Japanese national structure, and the cult of the emperor. It was a propaganda tool, consciously shaped and manipulated as part of the effort to forge a unified, modem nation out of a fundamentally feudal society, and to build a modem national military made up of conscripts from all tiers of society.
Bushid6 was believed to represent much more than just the ethic of the feudal warrior class. The Imperial Rescript to the Military of 1882 proclaimed that it "should be viewed as the reflection of the whole of the subjects of Japan."8 That is to say, warrior values were held to be the essence of Japanese-ness itself, unifying traits of character common to all classes. The abolition of the samurai class thus marked not the end of bushidr, but the point of its spread to the whole of the Japanese population.9
This content downloaded from 129. The foregoing has argued three main points: that "bushidd' is a very ambiguous term and one that covers a very wide range of thinking; that neither modem nor early modern ideas about the "way of the warrior" had much to do with authentic samurai behavior during the age when they were actually fighting; and that modem ideas about bushidJ and the samurai tradition were out of sync even with those of the early modem bureaucrats who first tried to enunciate a code of conduct for the samurailong after the samurai had ceased to be warriors.
The overall point to be taken is that the connection between Japan's modem and premodern military traditions is thin-it is certainly nowhere near as strong or direct as government propagandists, militarists, Imperial
Army officers, and some post-war historians have wished to believe. All of which is to say that politicians and others who condemn the samurai tradition, who blame the legacy of Japan's warrior past for the atrocities and other wartime misbehavior committed by the Imperial Army, are distorting history. To make this point just a bit clearer, I will conclude this article with a look at two specific patterns of Japanese wartime troop behavior: atrocities against civilian populations, and mistreatment of prisoners of war. Both of these behaviors seem particularly foreign and are particularly shocking to modem western audiences; and both have often been attributed to bushid6 and the samurai legacy.
On December 12, 1937 the Central China Expeditionary force of the Imperial Japanese Army captured the city of Nanking and went on a rampage against the city's civilian population. In the words of Lord
Russell of Liverpool, They looted, they burned, they raped and they murdered. Soldiers marched through the streets indiscriminately killing Chinese of both sexes, adults and children alike, without receiving any provocation and without rhyme or reason. They went on killing until the gutters ran with blood and the streets were littered with the bodies of their victims.... At the lowest computation twelve thousand men, women and children were shot or done to death during the first three days of the Japanese occupation.'5
The Rape of Nanking may be the worst and the most famous example of Japanese army abuses of civilians in occupied territories, but it was certainly not the only one. The question to be asked, however, is how acceptable this sort of behavior was, in terms of the Japanese military tradition. I would argue that it was aberrant, if not outright degenerate conduct by Japanese as well as western standards.
In the first place, the vast majority of the fighting in medieval times was civil warfare; the prizes contested were, for the most part, the control of agricultural lands and the peasants who cultivated them. Massacring or otherwise mistreating the occupants of newly captured territories was therefore counter-productive-fewer peasants meant more fields taken out of cultivation and also fewer men that could be conscripted into a feudal lord's army. It is true that medieval samurai made little or no formal distinction between combatants and noncombatants and for this reason showed few scruples against killing what modem readers would call civilians when it suited a specific military objective, but wanton incidental killings or destruction of property were exceedingly rare.
When winning generals felt the need to be vindictive and cruel after a campaign, they directed it toward enemy commanders, not ordinary troops or peasants. The Japanese never developed a tradition of pillaging conquered territories as did Ghengis Khan.
In the second place, Nanking-type incidents ran counter to the formal The Rape of Nanking and similar incidents, then, were clearly not con- The modern injunctions against surrender and capture were probably developed as a way for a country like Japan, which lacked the manpower resources of most of its potential enemies, to squeeze the most usage out of its troops. As American GIs learned repeatedly in their advance from island to island across the Pacific, a very small number of soldiers, already outmaneuvered and defeated by conventional standards, can keep a vastly superior force tied down for a very long time if they insist on fighting to the last man. Surrender, on the other hand, frees up enemy troops to be used elsewhere.
To sum up then, the military tradition of the medieval samurai has very little in common with the "bushidd' that was current in the early twentieth century, and does very little to explain the behavior of the Japanese Imperial Army. Far better clues to the attitudes of the Japanese high command, the officer corps, and the ordinary troops can be found in the specific circumstances of the war, the political atmosphere-both domestic and international--of the 1930s, and the process through which Japan emerged as a modern nation.
